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power. This paper focuses on the efficiency aspect of mergers and acquisitions to determine if they affect
shareholder wealth.
This article is available in The Park Place Economist: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol12/iss1/15
The Park Place Economist, Volume XII 62
George Coontz
Economic Impact of Corporate
Mergers and Acquisitions on
Acquiring Firm Shareholder Wealth
I.  INTRODUCTION
Mergers and acquisitions are a topicof great debate in today’s businessworld.  Some proponents argue
that mergers increase efficiency whereas opponents
argue that they decrease consumer welfare by mo-
nopoly power.  This paper focuses on the efficiency
aspect of mergers and acquisitions to determine if they
affect shareholder wealth.
What are some motives for a merger?  The
first motive, some might say
the most important of a pub-
lic company, is to increase
profitability and shareholder
wealth by an increase in stock
prices.  An increase in share
price means an increase in
shareholder wealth.  Inves-
tors want to invest in your
company if you show in-
creasing shareholder wealth over time.  Another mo-
tive might be diversification of industry.  This is one
way to lessen risk of a one-product corporation.  If
the firm is a diversified corporation, they become less
volatile.  For example, two corporations can com-
bine resources and become more efficient.  This leads
to economies of scale.  Economies of scale can be
defined as producing more at increased efficiency lev-
els.  This is basically being able to produce more at
cheaper rates.  The bigger a corporation is, the more
efficient its inputs of capital and labor can be.  An-
other motive for merger is geographic expansion.  If
you have a corporation in one area and want to ex-
pand to other areas, it is usually cheaper to merge
with a firm in the same industry in a different loca-
tion.  It is also important to note that there are sev-
eral anticompetitive effects that are also motives for
mergers.  Firms might choose to merge to lessen
competition in the marketplace or to achieve mo-
nopoly profits (Steiner, 1975).
Why would a company want to increase
shareholder wealth?  This question has many an-
swers.  One such reason is that if shareholders are
happy, it only makes sense
that they will continue to
invest in your company.
Another reason for an in-
crease in shareholder
wealth is an internal rea-
son.  Since a lot of direc-
tors and officers of corpo-
rations are shareholders,
they will try to achieve their
maximum value.  Another possibility resulting in an
increase in shareholder wealth is making money.  The
more money a firm is earning, the higher the share
price.  It is logical that an investor would want a part
of that.
The purpose of this research is to see if
mergers and acquisitions affect shareholder wealth
in the time before announcement dates and after
consummation dates.  The focus of this research is
to better understand market reactions to mergers.
This paper aims to find a reliable, consistent change
in shareholder wealth before the announcement and
after the consummation of the merger.  A goal is for
“Some proponents argue that
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whereas opponents argue that
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an investor to be able to use ofthese findings to pre-
dict the affect of mergers and acquisitions and invest
accordingly.
In Section II, I discuss previous literature on
the subject.  Section III presents relevant economic
theories.  In Section IV, I discuss hypotheses and es-
tablish a theoretical basis.  I present the empirical model
Section V and the data in Section VI.  Section VII
offers results and Section VIII focuses on conclu-
sions and avenues for future research.
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW
The corporation is a complex organism evolv-
ing over time.  Part of the evolution is with corporate
culture and traditional aging of a corporation, but the
area of evolution this paper focuses on is mergers
and acquisitions.  Over time, mergers and acquisi-
tions have been increasingly important to the evolu-
tion of the corporation.  There have been four merger
waves and a modern movement in
corporate merger history.  Accord-
ing to Gaughan (1996), the first
wave took place from 1897 to
1904.  The mergers in this wave
were mostly in the manufacturing
and mining industries.  One of the
most famous mergers happened
during this period – it was “the first
billion dollar mega merger deal
when U.S. Steel, founded by J.P.
Morgan, later joined with Carnegie Steel, founded
by Andrew Carnegie, and combined with its other
major rivals.  The resulting steel giant merged 785
separate firms.  At one time U.S. Steel accounted for
as much as 75% of the United States’ steel making
capacity (Gaughan, 1996).”  This is one example of a
large firm created by merger still in existence today.
But, U.S. Steel has seen its heyday and is now barely
in existence due to overseas cost efficient produc-
tion.
The second wave occurred between 1916
and 1929.  It is surprising that so many mergers oc-
curred during this period, because the antitrust laws
(Sherman and Clayton Acts) were enacted during this
time to deter monopoly action.  This wave came to a
crashing halt on October 24, 1929, Black Thurs-
day (Gaughan, 1996).  The third wave was between
1965 and 1969, also known as the conglomerate
period (Gaughan, 1996).  Many large firms were
created during this period.  The fourth merger pe-
riod was from 1981-1989 (Gaughan, 1996).  Dur-
ing this wave, mergers became larger and some even
international.  The current wave of mergers occurred
during the mid to late 1990’s.  This was a time of
great economic gains and usually with gains comes
the possibility of a merger or an acquisition.
Important facts to know about mergers are
that they are regulated by antitrust laws and the De-
partment of Justice.  Antitrust laws include the
Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914.
The meaning of these laws has evolved over time,
while at first, they were loosely enforced because
the government did not have the resources to fully
enforce the laws, but now, these laws play a huge
role in the workings of corpora-
tions.
I want to briefly discuss the
three major types of mergers:
horizontal, vertical, and con-
glomerate.  A horizontal merger
is a merger that is between di-
rect competitors in the same geo-
graphic and product markets
(Waldman, 2001).  A vertical
merger involves corporations
that are in different stages of manufacturing
(Waldman, 2001).  For example, a tire manufac-
turer would merge upstream with a rubber tree farm.
The last major section of mergers is conglomerate
mergers.  These involve corporations that operate
in different product or geographic markets
(Waldman, 2001).  This study looks at mergers
across type and does not focus on only one cat-
egory.
This paper looks at several studies to in-
vestigate motives and shareholder wealth effects.
Langetieg (1978) says that “positive pre-merger
excess returns indicate that the merger contributes
to stockholder welfare.”  In his study, Langetieg
examined pre and post-merger effects on stock-
“Over time, mergers
and acquisitions have
been increasingly im-
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holder gains with a three factor performance index.
This index is an expansion on previous work that
used a one and two factor model.  Langetieg’s model
included a control group of non-merging firms.  Start-
ing at two points before the merger announcement
date, 18 and 6 months before, he found a net ben-
efit to stockholders of 6.11% and -1.61%, respec-
tively.  This study showed that shareholder gains were
statistically insignificant.
In Amoako-Adu’s and Yagil’s (1986) study,
stock price behavior was examined.  They find that
in two months (-2) before the announcement date is
the first month where the change in the average re-
sidual is significant.  They also found that from months
(-2) to month (+2) from the announcement date are
where the most gains occur.  Before and after those
dates, gains are statistically insignificant from zero.
Agrawal, Jaffee, and Mandelker (1992) find
that after a merger, the acquirers have significant
underperformance.  They find that there is a signifi-
cant wealth loss of 10% in 5 years after the merger.
They suggest that this could be due to a lag in mar-
ket adjustment from announcement date.  Addition-
ally, “the long run performance reflects that part of
the net present value of the merger to the acquirer
which is not captured by the announcement period
return.”
Leeth and Borg (1994) investigate a his-
torical look at shareholder wealth and have some
interesting findings.  In the years of 1917 to 1924,
stock prices “remained essentially constant.  In
marked contrast, prices fell dramatically for acqui-
sitions completed during the merger wave of the late
1920’s.”  An interesting finding is that “investors
anticipated gains, bidding up stock price by 7 per-
cent on average before acquisition, but apparently
they reassessed potential profits after consolidation
driving stock price down.”
Previous studies state that there have been
varying degrees to the impact of mergers on share-
holder wealth.  Some studies provide a positive cor-
relation while others provide no relationship.  I in-
vestigate this relationship further in my study.
III.  ECONOMIC THEORY
The rational expectations hypothesis repre-
sents the principal theory used by investors for deci-
sion making.  This hypothesis states that investors
will have rational expectations about the future based
on logical information from today.  This assumes that
investors base decisions on all available knowledge,
or full information.
The main theory of my paper relates to share-
holder wealth.  Shareholder wealth is obtained by
looking at stock prices, as traded.  Since stock price
is forward looking, investors attempt to estimate the
present value of all future profits and/or earnings.  This
is important because if a merger takes place, this will
increase or decrease the present value of profits.  This
is the difference of the normal increase in price over
time and results in spikes where a merger occurs.  A
normal increase in price over time is due to the up-
ward trend of the market, as a whole.  Today there
are more public companies and investors fueling this
increase.  A spike where a merger or acquisition oc-
curs is due to an increase or decrease in shareholder
value due to the merger or acquisition.  This spike is
due to an expected increase or decrease in future
profits with the addition of the new firm and efficiency
gain.  Related to this is the bandwagon effect.  The
bandwagon effect occurs when investors choose to
invest in a particular stock simply because others are.
These types of investors are not making rational de-
cisions based upon knowledge of expected future
profits.  This type of investment adds false value to
the price of the stock.  The equation for future profits
in today’s money follows:
                                        n
P shareholder wealth = Σ (Rt / (1+r)t)
    t=0
where P is the price of  the stock, r is the interest
rate, Rt equals profits, n equals the number of peri-
ods (8), and t is time with t = 0 representing the initial
period.  Time is infinite since stocks and their value
exist in perpetuity.  The only problem with this is be-
ing able to determine the interest rate and everything
that influences the future profits, for instance eco-
nomic factors.
There are several elements that go into the
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motivation for mergers, which can influence share
price.  First of all, there is the efficiency theory.  This
theory directly relates to the cost of production.  A
company will merge or acquire another firm if the
merger will increase economies of scale and scope.
An economy of scale is when a company doubles
its outputs for less than twice the cost (Pindyck,
2001).  An economy of scope is when a single firm
can produce at greater levels than two different firms,
each producing separately (Pindyck, 2001).
Another theory is that of monopoly power.
If a firm is able to obtain a monopoly or monopoly
power without competitors or the Department of
Justice finding out, they would be able to perform
better in the long-run for their shareholders to by
maximizing shareholder wealth.  As a monopolist,
they would be able to price off of the marginal rev-
enue curve to capture the producer surplus, which
would not ordinarily be obtained under perfect com-
petition.  Another element of merger motivation is
empire building.  This contributes to the wealth of
the shareholders because as a firm gets larger, its
ability to produce profits is greater.
IV.  HYPOTHESES
My hypotheses follow:
1. I predict, ceteris paribus, that before
the announcement date, there will be an
increase in shareholder wealth of the ac-
quiring firm.
Rational expectations state that investors
make rational decisions about future earnings.  A
merger or acquisition should, in theory, be motivated
by product extension or efficiency, therefore creat-
ing increases in shareholder wealth.
2. I predict, ceteris paribus, that right be-
fore (10 days) the announcement date
of the merger or acquisition, shareholder
wealth will increase once again.
The bandwagon effect is in effect here.  If a
lot of investors see an opportunity where other in-
vestors are taking a chance, this will cause increases
in shareholder wealth due to the act.  The band-
wagon effect reinforces the effects discussed in the
previous hypothesis.
3. I foresee, ceteris paribus, that after con-
summation date, shareholder wealth will
increase.
The rational expectations hypothesis states
that investors make decisions based upon the present
value of future profits.  If the merger is taking effect
because of motives for profit and efficiency, share-
holder wealth will increase due to this increased ex-
pected return.  This is dependant on not every gain
being rationalized and expected before the consum-
mation date.
V.  EMPIRICAL MODEL
To test the previous hypotheses, I use sev-
eral tests.  I test the change in values over time of the
acquiring firm.  I focus on announcement and con-
summation dates of mergers and acquisitions, which
were announced and consummated in 2001 at over
one billion dollars.  I obtain data from 60 trading days
before announcement (the reason behind using data
prior to announcement is that generally there is a
“buzz” or rumors about a prospective deal) and 60
days after consummation of the merger.  I take these
dates and their respective values and determine their
change over time.  From this, I obtain the value for
the “shareholder change” component of my equa-
tion.  I use this same method to determine the value
for “S&P 500 change.”  The equation follows:
%∆P stock price - %∆P S&P500 = change in shareholder wealth
                              relative to S&P 500
This equation provides a value which I can
compare across firms.  I do this for each day (60
days before announcement and 60 days after con-
summation).  I then find the average for the sample
for each respective day.  If this value is large, there is
a significant difference between the S&P 500 index
and the shareholder wealth of the acquiring firm.  If
this value is small, either positive or negative, there is
little deviation from the index value.  Once I have
these values for each firm, I can compute an average
value and a standard deviation.
VI.  DATA
I test my hypotheses by combining data from
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various sources.  I obtain stock price (shareholder
wealth) from Yahoo Finance (Yahoo, 2003).  I am
able to get the exact time period data from this site
for each company.  In order to obtain the exact an-
nouncement and consummation dates, I use
Mergerstat Review 2002 (2002) and Merger & Ac-
quisition Sourcebook 2002 (Dolbeck, 2002).  These
journals provide all the company information, merger
information (type and size), and dates.  To obtain data
on the S&P 500 index, I use Yahoo Finance (Yahoo,
2003).  I also use the Standard and Poor’s company
website (Standard, 2003).  I use this data as a proxy
for the whole market and as a control for seasonal
market fluctuations and trends.  I compile all of my
data into tables and spreadsheets.
The S&P 500 index is a “world-renowned
index including 500 leading companies in leading in-
dustries of the United States” (Standard and Poor’s,
2003).  This index is a good proxy for market perfor-
mance, overall.  Just like the actual business world,
the index is broken into sectors.  These sectors in-
clude energy, materials, industrials, consumer discre-
tionary, consumer staples, healthcare, financials, in-
formation technology, telecommunication services, and
utilities (Standard and Poor’s, 2003).  The S&P 500
reports index values at the end of each day.
VII.  RESULTS
The results of this study were not expected,
but still are very important.  My hypotheses were
not supported; actually, the opposite happened.  I
was able to sufficiently test 15 companies, which
had a merger or acquisition value of over 1 billion
dollars.  In 2001, there were 54 mergers at over 1
billion dollars.  I created a sample by taking each
industry that had a merger value of over 1 billion
dollars.  If there was only one merger of that value,
I used that merger. However, if there were more
mergers of that value, I took the largest merger in
dollar value as my sample merger.
The results of this study did not provide sup-
port for hypothesis 1.  I found that in the 60 days
before an announcement of a merger, there is a trend
of the acquiring firm to under-perform the S&P 500
index, as Figure 1 shows.  There is an overall trend
downward, but fluctuation everyday of positive and
negative company performance, as compared to the
S&P 500 index.  The biggest finding of this is that
there is a sharp down turn at 2 days prior to the
announcement.  This downturn indicates that there
is a negative expected performance from the merger
with increased efficiencies not expected
The results partially support hypothesis 2.  I
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had expected a positive trend for the same reasons
as in the first hypothesis.  As Figure 2 shows, ten
days before the announcement once again shows a
decrease in shareholder wealth in comparison to the
S&P 500 index.  The majority of the trend line de-
crease is located in the two days prior to the an-
nouncement indicating that an announcement is ex-
pected and it will have a negative effect on share-
holder wealth.  This seems to present the idea that, at
least for the 15 firms in this study, on average, merg-
ers and acquisitions do not benefit shareholder wealth
in the acquiring firm before the announcement date.
The results of this study do not support hy-
pothesis 3.  The trend over 60 days after consum-
mation date of the merger or acquisition is down-
ward sloping, but only minimal, as shown in Figure 3.
George Coontz
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This could be due to the idea that all of the expected
increase in shareholder wealth was realized between
the announcement and consummation dates of the
merger.  The stock price could just be getting back to
its rational price during this time because the band-
wagon effect drove prices up above rational levels
or, in other words, the stock was overvalued and now
is going towards its real value.
An interesting finding, however, is that in the
first 10 days after consummating the merger, the trend
was to increase relative to the S&P 500 index, as
shown by Figure 4.  This could be just an anomaly
where one or two merger companies performed well,
while others remained constant.  The trend is upward,
but at a very small rate thus leading me to believe that
this is not a consistent result.
I was also able to obtain some descriptive
data, which provides some insight into my sample.
Table 1 presents this information.  The standard de-
viations for before and after the merger or acquisi-
tion are relatively similar.  This means that, on aver-
age, the data for each day does not vary that much
before and after the merger.  The average for all
days before the merger or acquisition is negative.
This means that more time was spent under-per-
forming the S&P 500 than days over-performing it.
On the contrary, the average for all days after the
consummation of the merger or acquisition was posi-
tive.  This indicates that after the consummation,
more days outperformed the S&P 500 or the fre-
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quency of the days in over-performance was greater.
In comparing the minimum and maximum numbers,
prior to the announcement had a lower minimum
than after and after consummation had a higher max
than prior to announcement.  This shows that, on
average, mergers and acquisitions increase the ex-
treme values.
VIII.  CONCLUSION
This paper touches on an important topic in
corporate finance and economics, mergers and ac-
quisitions.  I find that, on average, merger or acqui-
sitions, in the 15 firm sample, do not, on average,
improve shareholder wealth of the acquiring firm;
rather, it actually decreases it.  This is important be-
cause the function of a company is to make money
and transfer the profits to the stakeholders and risk
takers of the corporations, the shareholders.  If the
goal is to maximize share-
holder wealth, why would a
corporation want to merge or
acquire another firm if data
suggests that it actually wors-
ens shareholder wealth?  The
answer to this question is
hard to pinpoint.  First of all,
the corporation might not be
maximizing shareholder
wealth.  This should alarm
shareholders because they
are paying for more than what they are getting in
return.  In other words, a company is actually worth
less than is paid for it.  If this is the case, the Board
of Directors and Officers are not fulfilling their fidu-
ciary duty to shareholders.  Where is this transfer of
wealth going if it is not going to the shareholders?  It
may be the case that there was a differing in valua-
tion of the merger from acquiring firm to the firm
that was acquired.  This would occur if “the buyer
has made an offer too good to refuse” (Ravenscraft,
1987).  They could also come to this variance by
not making an informed rational decision, if one party
withheld information, or if one firm would benefit
more.
Another answer to this could be the small
sample size of only large mergers and acquisitions.
To increase the significance of this study, more firms
could be added to increase the validity of this study.
With a sample of only 15 firms out of 54, there is
room for improvement.  There is also room for im-
provement in mergers valued at under 1 billion dol-
lars.  This study aimed to focus on the large firms
with the rationale that they would have the most
shareholders and would show the best results.  After
further investigation, smaller mergers or acquisitions
could possibly show more fluctuations in value.
One must also look at long-run effects verses
short-run effects.  This study only looks at a short
time frame after the merger; it might be that the moti-
vation was in the long-term, longer than 60 days.  It
would be interesting to look at these firms in the long-
run – a year or longer – to see if the results might be
different.  It might be that the efficiency gains have
not had time to manifest in
the short-run thus causing
temporary diseconomies
of scale.  This could be
what drove shareholder
wealth down in this
sample.
Another explanation
could be that “the acquir-
ing company has offered to
pay too high a price for the
target” (Kaen, 2003).  If
this is the case, then the benefit of the merger would
go to the shareholder of the acquired firm and the
shareholders of the acquiring firm would lose value
and wealth.
The overall trend in the firms that this study
investigated was downward.  This leads me to be-
lieve that these firms are mature, and they could have
undertaken these mergers to gain a new product or
region to continue to perform at growing company
levels.  If this is the case, they would be fulfilling their
fiduciary duty to shareholders by sustaining the firm.
Kaen states that one way for managers in declining
industries to maintain their jobs is to seek and ac-
quire a growing company.  These usually do not per-
form well and “it is even more doubtful that there are
 “If the goal is to maximize
shareholder wealth, why would
a corporation want to merge or
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unique synergies between the declining firm and the
growth industry.  Investors generally are skeptical of
such acquisitions and drive down the price of the ‘old-
line’ acquiring firm” (Kaen, 2003).  It can be con-
cluded from this that if a declining firm wanted to sus-
tain itself, it should not undertake a merger with a
growing company utilizing its current managers and
management style.  It would not increase shareholder
wealth.
The goal of this study was to determine if
mergers and acquisitions affect shareholder wealth in
order to invest accordingly.  In the sample of mergers
studied, there is evidence that an investor should not
invest in companies that are planning to acquire an-
other because the trend is to under-perform the mar-
ket.
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